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NOTES
clearly so when it is remembered that the Bar controls in all aspects
the operation of the plan. In fact, expert analysis has leveled that
fear and asserted that adoption of the plan would be a forward step
in nullifying any socialistic trends in the Bar, a view strongly as-
serted by Judge Augustus Hand."3 The American Bar Association
Journal published an editorial entitled "Legal Service Policies" in
its December 1946 issue which said in part:
"As to the organization of legal services for persons of moderate
means.. .the profession is confronted with an early choice as to
whether it will maintain its historic prerogatives and position by
itself fulfilling the new needs, or will stand by while these essential
forms of legal service are taken over by institutions, by labor organ-
izations, or by bureaus of government."
"The alternatives have been clearly presented to the Bar. In its
own field of service to the poor, legal aid has proved to be not the
entering wedge for socialization but a great force adamantly holding
back the pressure for socialization and abating the pressure by the
extent to which Legal Aid Officers have been created, properly
staffed, decently supported, and honestly maintained."'  This latter
statement should have equal application to results achieved and ex-
pected to be achieved by Lawyer Reference Plans.
There is every reason to believe that minimum benefits arising
from adoption of the plan will include: more and better legal service
for the public at large, better public relations for state and local bar
associations, elimination of many widespread misconceptions regard-
ing the legal profession and its members, and a retardation of any
tendency toward governmental intervention in the lawyer's conse-
crated task of aiding in the administration of justice. As so forcefully
expressed by, Harold J. Gallagher, President of the American Bar
Association, every lawyer should participate in " a great public cru-
sade of the legal profession, which has for its goal the happiness and
prosperity of all people."'
REAL PROPERTY-EQUITABLE CHARGES-EFFECT OF DEED WHEREIN
GRANTEE PROMISES TO PAY ANNUITY AND FURNISH MEAT TO GRANTOR
A North Dakota attorney was recently faced with a fact situation
which presented a problem of increasing importance in view of the
fact that grants of property of the type involved are becoming a rela-
tively common occurrence. The deeds in question were in the regular
warranty form, with no change in the granting clause or in the
habendum clause as they ordinarily appear on the printed form,
but contained the following wording:
" Smith supra note 3, at 5, Fear that Britain will "socialize" its legal system
has been declared groundless. Smith, The Ei-ngsh Legal Assistance Plan: Its Signifi-
cance for American Legal ITntitutions, 35 A. B. A. J. 453 (1949).
s' Smith, supra note 3, at 51.
Gallagher, supra note 4, at 26.
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"It is a condition of this Deed, agreed to by and between the grantors
and the grantee, that said John Jones, a single person (the grantee)
as a further consideration for this Deed, will pay to Henry Jones
and 'Mary Jones, husband and wife, grantors, each $100 per year
making a total of $200 per year commencing November 1, 1950 with
the first payment and the sum of $200 each on each and every No-
vember lt thereafter as long as said Henry Jones and Mary Jones
shall live. On the death of either said Henry Jones or Mary Jones, the
$100 annual payment to them shall cease. When both Henry Jones
and Mary Jones shall have died this condition of the $100 payments
per year to each of them shall no longer be a condition of this
deed."
It is a further condition of this Deed that during each odd num-
bered year, commencing with the year 1951, said John Jones (the
grantee) shall furnish to said Henry Jones and Mary Jones, hus-
band and wife, so long as they shall live, the meat for their daily
diet. This condition shall cease when said Henry Jones and Mary
Jones, husband and wife, have both died.
The probable purpose of the transfer having been made in this
manner was to avoid probate proceedings upon the death of the
grantors, yet assuring to the grantors some provision for their old
age. But the result of these grants is beset with certain difficulties
in determining what type of property interest has been created in
the grantor and the grantee. Such is the immediate problem facing
an attorney who is consulted by a prospective purchaser of land
transferred by a deed such as that set out. The fear of purchasing
land subject to a possibly defeasible interest, or a subsequently
developing encumbrance, has in such cases deterred prospective
purchasers from buying the beclouded interest.
The main problem arises in considering whether the deed is abso-
lute on its face, or whether the agreement to pay money and meat
imports a condition. It is fundamental that courts tend to construe a
condition as being subsequent rather than defer the vesting of the
estate.1 And wherever possible the courts will construe the language
as a covenant rather than a condition, since forfeitures are judicially
disfavored. Without the required words of forfeiture it will usually
be construed as a covenant2 and no provisions will be interpreted as
creating a condition if the language of the instrument will bear any
other rea.onable interpretation. But if the language used unequivo-
cally indicates an intention on the part of the grantor to that effect
and plainly admits of such construction, then a condition will be
Thompson v. Thompson, 175 S. W. 2d 885 (Mo. 1943); Friesz v. Friesz, 344
Mo. 698, 127 S. W. 2d 174 (1939); Patton, Titles § 118 (1938).
1 Stinson v. Oklahoma Ry., 190 Okla. 624, 126 P. 2d 260 (1942). Many
courts look to the remedy, saying that if the remedy is one of damages the court
will construe the language as a covenant, whereas if the remedy is forfeiture and
reversion the court will interpret a condition. Carpenter v. New Brunswick, 135 N. J.
Eq. 397, 39 A. 2d 40 (1944).
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found.' However, in the instant case it appears the grantors made an
absolute conveyance without reservation to themselves of the right
of entry necessary to terminate the grantee's interest; read from the
four corners of the instrument it is concluded that the grantor in-
'tended and did grant an absolute right to the property in fee, sub-
ject to no limitation which would divest the grantee's interest.'
The next inquiry is in regard to the nature of the interest that is
created when the grantors make provision for meat and yearly pay-
ments to themselves or. to another. After a consideration of the
various types of property interests, the author concluded that the
effect of such a deed was to create an equitable charge, a type of
property interest with which the practitioner and student of law are
relatively unfamiliar, but about which very little has been written.
Basically, an equitable charge, as described by one British authority
is "an agreement, declaration, or direction, whereby real or personal
estate is expressly or constructively made liable, otherwise than by
way of mortgage, to the discharge of some pecuniary burden-as a
debt, or legacy.. ." Generally equitable charges are created through
wills, usually by a devise upon condition that the devisee shall pay
an annuity or support money, though of course a deed can also
create such a charge.'
It has been suggested that the grantor's recovery may possibly be
had on four theories7 should the transferee fail to make the stipulat-
ed payments. They are the grant on a condition theory and that of
equitable charges, both already discussed, and the contract and
trust theories.
While some courts have noted the similarity between a trust and
a personal charge,' certain elements of a trust are lacking in the
personal charge. The trustee, like the grantee, obtains legal title to
3 Carey v. City of Casper, 213 P. 2d 26 (Wyo. 1950). See Rood, Wills 595
(2d ed. 1926).
4 ''The component parts of a condition subsequent are: (1) A condition or re-
striction; and (2) a right of re-entry. But no particular technical words are nec-
essary, and, if there is sufficient evidence otherwise to prove this to be the charac-
ter of a clause, the right of re-entry will be implied. Due, however, to the dis-
favor in which forfeitures are held, the courts are inclined whenever possible to
construe a clause as a covenant only rather than as a condition subsequent." Pat-
ton, Titles § 116 (1938).
Edwards, Law of Property in Land and Conveyancing 201 (5th ed. 1922).
o In regard to conditions in wills involving support or payments to others, see
Atkinson, Wills 361 (1937). See also, Logan v. Glass, 120 Pa. Super. 221, 7' A. 2d
116, 120 (1939).
7 (1948) Wis. L. Rev. 556. The case discussed in this note, Sutherland v. Pier-
ner, 249 Wis. 462, 24 N. W. 2d 883 (1946), is analagous to the fact situation
here being discussed except that amounts charged were liquidated and not in the
nature of periodic payments for support. Payments were to be made to third parties
beneficiary upon the death of the grantor. The court there held the grantee to be
trustee for the amounts to be paid to the beneficiaries. See also, Rood, Wills 708
(2d ed. 1926).
a Woodley v. Woodley, 47 Cal. App. 2d 188, 117 P. 2d 722 (1941); Dial v.
Dial, 378 II1. 276, 38 N. E. 2d 43 (1941).
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the property, but the trustee is entitled to no beneficial use of the
property.' And it is to be noted that in the case of a charge the real
estate is transferred generally for the beneficial enjoyment of the
transferee, subject only to the payment of certain sums or to the
performance of a duty, whereas in the case of a trust the trustee is
denied beneficial use of the property and is vested with title only
for a particular purpose."° A further distinction between a charge and
a trust is that in the case of charge no fiduciary relationship exists
since under the charge concept a debtor-creditor relationship arises."
But it is clear that even though a charge be established and a particu-
lar portion of the land be charged, the holder of the charge neither
gains nor reserves title to any portion of the property as against the
person charged.' Some courts have gone so far as to declare the
grantee a trustee for certain rents and profits if the charge is in the
nature of a direction to care for another person." Even this is not a
true trust relationship since a trustee in default of his duties to the
beneficiary will be divested of his office as trustee and the land
will vest in a succeeding trustee appointed by the court." If the
foregoing deed were to be held to have established a trust relation-
ship the court would have to declare a forfeiture in order to divest
the grantee of his office as trustee for rents and profits. But if it be
interpreted as a charge, an action will lie against the person so
charged at law for the satisfaction of the claim.
This brings into consideration the possibility of recovery under the
contract theory." It is a widely accepted principle of law that a
grantee who accepts a deed with covenant annexed will be deemed
to have accepted the obligation imposed by the covenant despite the
fact that not having signed the deed he has not signed the covenant."6
This fact was clearly brought out in a recent Iowa case, ' wherein
it was held that "the remedies available.. .are analagous to those
...upon a debt secured by a mortgage on real estate. Upon failure
9 Thompson, Real Property § 2710 (1940).
" Restatement, Trusts 1 10 (1935): "Generally speaking, a transfer which
gives a beneficial interest in the property to the transferee and a mere security
interest in the third person creates an equitable charge, while a transfer which
gives a beneficial interest in the property to a third person and imposes upon the
transferee the duty to deal with the property for the benefit of such third person,
creates a trust."
'1 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 351 Pa. 413, 41 A. 2d 559 (1945); Broaddus v. Gresham,
188 Va. 725, 26 S. E. 2d 33 (1943).
12 Farna.., v. Farnam, 83 Conn. 369, 77 At. 70 (1910); Gross v. Sheeler, 7
Houst. (12 Del.) 280, 81 Atl. 812 (1885).
U Anderson v. Crist, 113 Ind. 65, 15 N. E. 9 (1888).
54 Restatement, Trusts 1 107, comment a (1935).
" Coykendall v. Kellogg, 50 N. D. 857, 198 N. W. 472 (1924). This case is the
only North Dakota case found which is analagous to the instant case. Here the
grantee of a warranty deed agreed to support the grantor and their mother during
their lifetime, the- "granted lands shall stand as security therefor." The court
held that the grantor had a valid lien upon the lands conveyed to insure performance
of the contract for support.
I Coykendall v. Kellogg, supra note 15.
11 Anderson v. Anderson, 234 Iowa 277, 12 N. W. 2d 571 (1944).
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of the devisee to pay the charged legacy when due, the legatee may
enforce payment by an action at law against the devisee personally
upon his implied promise to pay without resorting to the land."
But is this a personal liability only? It has been held that a mere
recommendation that the devisee of real property support and care
for another is a purely personal charge." Yet, holdings under early
law notwithstanding," there seems to be good authority that the at-
tachment of personal liability upon the grantee by reason of his
acceptance of the deed does not affect the lien or the charge on the
land or bar a proceeding against the land.' The court in Anderson v.
Anderson,1 wherein the testator devised certain premises to his son
on condition that the son pay to the mother $3 per acre per year
during her life, held the remedies to be concurrent, saying, "The
lien and the personal obligation are part of the same transaction
which may be said to include the charging of the legacy on the real
estate, testator's offer of said real estate to the devisee conditioned
upon devisee's agreement to pay the charged legacy and the devisee's
acceptance of the offer. Although technically the lien and the per-
sonal obligation do not attach at the same time and perhaps either
could be created alone, where both are present they could afford
the legatee concurrent remedies for enforcing payment." It would
seem, therefore, that both a legal and an equitable remedy exist in
the grantor, and that if the legal remedy fails, the grantor may rely
upon the equitable remedy against the land; he may be said to have
the right of election as to which remedy he will pursue." The fact
that the amount of such charge is indefinite or that time of payment is
indefinite would not bar the remedy."
It having been concluded after a search of recognized authorities
that either the land or the grantee may be held liable for payment
of the charge, the question logically arises whether the transferee
of the grantee may also be held liable for payment of the charge.
It seems well settled that affirmative covenants do not run with the
land unless the grantor and grantee expressly so provided and in-
tended, since affirmative covenants are generally held to be personal
in nature." But the general rule is that affirmative covenants creat-
ing easements do not run whereas those relative to rents, profits,
and income do,' so long as the agreement to pay to the grantor or
third persons was a part of the consideration in exchange for which
the deed was given." This situation would be analagous to an equit-
" Perdue v. Perdue. 124 N. C. 161, 32 S. E. 492 (1899).
12 Restatement, Trusts § 14, comment a (1935).
20 Anderson v. Anderson, supra note 17; Patton, Titles § 318 (1938).
1 234 Iowa 277, 12 N. W. 2d 571, 574 (1944). See also, Powell v. Powell, 335
Ill. 604, 167 N. E. 802 (1929).
0 Nolan v. Donahoe, 161 Wis. 22, 152, N. W. 468, 469 (1915). See also, Rood,
Wills 699 (2d ed. 1926)..
" Pfeffer v. Pinn, 239 Iowa 24, 30 N. W. 2d 481 (1948).
24 Salvi v. Manning Paper Co., 168 Misc. 661, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 86 (1938).
' Mathis v. Mathis, 402 Ill. 60, 83 N. E. 2d 270 (1948).
0 Cf. Mathis v Mathis, supra note 25.
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able mortgage." But if the obligation is expressly made a charge
upon the land,." or where the obligation is to be interpreted as a
lien, ' it appears the charge cannot be defeated by any act of the gran-
tee and remains a charge upon the land until paid, the transferee
taking with notice." These charges have been likened to annuities,"
and most courts now hold that the real estate, as well as the person,
is liable for satisfaction of the debt," despite earlier holdings to the
contrary.'
Still further difficulty arises when the question of past-due pay-
ments is considered. The court in Stringer v. Gamble" held that the
estate of the devisee after his death would be liable for past-due pay-
ments unless barred by the Statute of Limitations. It would follow
therefrom that the transferee of the devisee or grantee would have
to obtain a release from the grantor or third party beneficiary (which
ever is the beneficiary of the charge) in order that such transferee
be absolved from any liability attaching to his transferor and as yet
unpaid at the time of transfer."
In conclusion it is submitted that a model arrangement would
have been for the parents to have transferred the land to the son
reserving a life estate in themselves; and then to secure to the son
the use of the land, a lease could have been drawn embodying sub-
stantially the same terms regarding the annuity and the payment
of meat as were contained in the transfer instrument in the instant
case. A person holding a fee subject to a prior life estate does not
require the benefit of probate to have his right of possession secured
to him. His interest would then vest in possession upon the death of
the life tenants by operation of law.
The interest of the parents is better protected in the model ar-
rangement because they have clearly retained an interest in the land
for their lives and are not left with a claim of doubtful nature. The
grantors remedy upon default by the son under the terms of the
- Patton, Titles 1 313, n. 105 (1938).
2' Neikirk v. Lawaster, 261 Pa. 571, 104 Ati. 759 (1918).
29 Low v. Ramsey, 135 Ky. 333, 122 S. W. 167 (1909); Coykendall v. Kellogg,
50 N. D. 857, 198 N. W. 472 (1924).
'0 Henry v. Griffis, 89 Iowa 543, 56 N. W. 670 (1893); Low v. Ramsey, supra
note 29; Coykendall v. Kellogg, supra note 29; Taylor v. Turner, 114 W. Va. 707, 173
S. E. 777 (1934).
11 3 Page, Wills § 1460 (1940). Although strictly speaking annuities arise more
often throu.*" wills than by deeds, they have been entered into this article because
of the very close parallel which exists between them and equitable charges.
'5 Whitehouse v. Cargill, 86 Me. 60, 29 Atl. 934 (1893); Fuller v. Puller, 84
Me. 475, 24 Atl. 946 (1892); Stringer v. Gamble, 155 Mich. 295, 118 N. W. 979
(1909); Patton, Titles § 313 (1938).
10 2 BI. Comm. *40: "A yearly sum, the payment of which is chargeable only
upon the person of the grantor."
'5 155 Mich. 295, 118 N. W. 979 (1909). In this case the testator devised a
farm to his son on condition that the son pay annual amounts to testator's wife
during her life. The court held him personally liable, held that the land was
charged, and held that the estate of the devisee after his death would be liable.
"3 Nudd v. Powers, 136 Mass. 273 (1884).
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lease would be the same as any other lessor's, and there is no pos-
sibility of the land being transferred without their consent to strang-
ers with whom they might not care to deal. Whatever desirable re-
sults might be sought by the deed herein described can be more
certainly and just as advantageously reached through recognized and
accepted modes of transfer.
